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service has proceeded fitfully: while Congress intended to increase local competition with the passage of 
the 1996 Telecommunications Act, the RBOCs continue largely as monopoly providers. Despite only 
partial deregulation, however, former Bell System companies have fundamentally restructured their 
operations to compete with a growing number of new nonunion entrants; and they have focused heavily 
on cutting labor costs. Labor-management relations, cooperative under the prior regulated regime, have 
deteriorated substantially; and unions have had minimal influence on managerial strategies in the 
deregulated era (Keefe and Batt 1997). 
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and wage inequality since deregulation began? Second, what is the effect of deunionization on wage 
inequality in the industry as a whole and within occupational groups? Third, to what extent has inequality 
increased within both the union and nonunion segments of the industry? To answer these questions, we 
analyze the Current Population Survey (CPS) annual earnings files (1983 to 1996). We interpret these data 
in the context of field research on managerial and union strategies in response to deregulation. 
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Labor Market Outcomes of 
Deregulation in 
Telecommunications Services 
ROSEMARY BATT AND MICHAEL STRAUSSER 
Cornell University 
This paper examines the labor market outcomes of deregulation in the 
telecommunications industry, focusing specifically on changes in union den-
sity, real wages, wage inequality, and employment levels. Deregulation of 
telecommunications long distance and equipment markets began in 1984 
with the dismantling of the highly unionized Bell System into AT&T (the 
long distance and equipment provider) and seven Regional Bell Operating 
Companies (RBOCs, the local service providers). Deregulation of local ser-
vice has proceeded fitfully: while Congress intended to increase local com-
petition with the passage of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, the RBOCs 
continue largely as monopoly providers. Despite only partial deregulation, 
however, former Bell System companies have fundamentally restructured 
their operations to compete with a growing number of new nonunion en-
trants; and they have focused heavily on cutting labor costs. Labor-manage-
ment relations, cooperative under the prior regulated regime, have deterio-
rated substantially; and unions have had minimal influence on managerial 
strategies in the deregulated era (Keefe and Batt 1997). 
In this paper, we focus on three questions. First, what are the overall 
trends in unionization, real wages, and wage inequality since deregulation 
began? Second, what is the effect of deunionization on wage inequality in 
the industry as a whole and within occupational groups? Third, to what 
extent has inequality increased within both the union and nonunion seg-
ments of the industry? To answer these questions, we analyze the Current 
Population Survey (CPS) annual earnings files (1983 to 1996). We interpret 
these data in the context of field research on managerial and union strate-
gies in response to deregulation. 
Previous Research 
Prior research on wage inequality shows that unions play a key role in 
limiting wage dispersion by raising the relative wages of lower-skilled work-
ers and by reducing the wage gap between blue-collar and white-collar 
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employees (Freeman and Medoff 1984). Cross-national research shows 
that higher levels of union density are associated with lower levels of wage 
inequality (Card and Freeman 1993; Fortin and Lemieux 1997). Also, the 
decline in union density in recent decades is associated with greater wage 
inequality because employment shifts to the nonunion sector where wages 
are more market-driven (Asher and DeFina 1997). Dinardo and Lemieux 
(1997) find that a more severe drop in unionization in the U.S. compared 
to Canada accounts for two-thirds of the differential growth in wage 
inequality between the two countries. 
This paper contributes to the literature on wage inequality by examin-
ing the relationship between deregulation, deunionization, and wage 
inequality among detailed occupational groups within one industry. Most 
research on deunionization has taken a more aggregate approach; and 
while researchers have found increased wage inequality within age and 
education cohorts (e.g., Levy and Murname 1992; Freeman and Katz 
1996), few studies have focused on these outcomes within occupation/ 
industry groups. 
In addition, while there is evidence that wage inequality has increased 
within both the union and nonunion segments of the labor market (e.g., 
Freeman 1996), few analyses compare the changes in wage distribution 
within each segment (an exception is Chaykowski and Slotsve 1996). 
Finally, this paper compares the extent of change in the 1990s versus the 
1980s. Prior work on the relationship between deregulation and deunion-
ization has focused primarily on the 1970s and 1980s (e.g., Fortin and 
Lemieux 1997). 
Industry Context 
To understand how deregulation has affected the structure of employ-
ment and wages in the last decade, it is important to review the stylized 
facts of the Bell System, pre- and post-deregulation in 1984 (see Keefe and 
Batt 1997 for a detailed review). Prior to 1984, the Bell System consisted of 
over 1 million employees who represented over 90% of the work force in 
the entire industry. Sixty-five percent of the work force was unionized, rep-
resented either by the Communications Workers of America (CWA, the 
dominant union), the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers 
(IBEW), or an independent union. 
The Bell System provided "universal service" to the public through a 
highly standardized and nationally integrated system of equipment and 
operating procedures. The companies and union developed a national sys-
tem of internal labor market rules governing the structure of jobs, training 
and advancement, compensation, and employment security. Given the 
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undifferentiated nature of the product and customer, the structure of jobs 
was relatively simple, with two core nonmanagement occupations: a pri-
marily female work force of office workers (operators, clericals, service and 
sales workers) who handled customer transactions, and a primarily male 
work force of network technicians who maintained the switching and trans-
mission infrastructure. 
The unions helped reduce wage dispersion through several collective 
bargaining agreements beginning in the 1960s. In 1968, AT&T and the 
CWA established six national wage zones to deal with the effects of varia-
tion in the cost of living. In the 1971, 1974, and 1980 contracts, AT&T 
agreed to special wage adjustments in lower-paid, traditionally female jobs. 
The CWA also negotiated reductions in the amount of time it takes a 
worker to reach top pay in any wage grade from 8-10 years to 4-5 years 
(Keefe 1989). Keefe found that the major source of reductions in wage dis-
persion was across departmental average wages. 
In the post-1984 period, the former Bell companies focused on cost re-
duction in order to face new nonunion entrants who enjoyed lower cost 
(younger and nonunion) labor; lower overhead; and new, more maintenance-
free technologies. The former Bells downsized nonmanagement positions 
by between 30% and 60%, depending on the company. They reorganized 
into market-driven business units that target particular customer seg-
ments—large business, small business, and residential. Digital technologies 
provided the opportunity to offer customized bundles of services to differ-
ent customer segments. The customer segmentation strategy translated into 
a labor segmentation strategy for each occupation. On the sales and service 
side, companies redesigned jobs and wages to fit the demands of differenti-
ated customer segments. This redesign entailed an increase in the work 
force dedicated to sales and a functionalization of jobs into sales, service, 
and support functions. For the technical work force, the change from ana-
log to digital systems shifted the demand for skill from those trained in ana-
log systems to those with digital skills. As the companies created new job 
titles, the unions were left with negotiating appropriate wage rates. Despite 
the break-up of the Bell System, however, analysis of union contracts since 
deregulation shows that the companies and unions have maintained a fairly 
consistent national pattern of bargaining (Keefe and Boroff 1994). 
Data 
Data for this paper come from the merged annual earnings file of the 
CPS for the telecommunications services industry (SIC code 481) between 
1983 and 1996 (prior years do not include union status). The data are com-
piled from the monthly outgoing rotation group. Our sample includes persons 
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over 16 years of age who were employed for at least 35 hours per week and 
who reported earnings above the minimum wage. The sample, therefore, 
excludes part-time workers, thereby providing a relatively conservative esti-
mate of wage inequality The sample includes 2,073 observations in 1983, 
declining to 1,477 in 1996. We identify two broad occupational groups: 
clerical/sales and technical. Clerical includes computer operators, secre-
taries, typists, telephone operators, and order clerks. We combine clerical 
and sales groups for purposes of analysis because the content of work in 
these two categories overlaps. "Customer service representatives" for exam-
ple, often primarily do sales. Technical workers include computer program-
mers, electrical and electronic technicians, telephone installers and repair-
men, linemen and splicers, electronic repairers, and other technicians. 
Wages are adjusted according to the CPI-U, where 1983 equals 99.6. 
Findings 
Two overall findings are noteworthy. First, union density fell dramati-
cally and wage inequality rose significantly between 1983 and 1996—more 
than for the economy as a whole. As a result, by 1996 the level of wage 
inequality in telecommunications was converging on that of the U.S. popu-
lation as a whole. The extent of change in such a short time is striking 
because deregulation in most of the industry has largely failed to material-
ize. That is, because regional Bell operating companies—which employ the 
majority of the industry's work force—still operate as regulated monopo-
lies, the most significant effects of deregulation are yet to be felt. 
Second, the most dramatic changes occurred in the 1990s, rather than 
in the 1980s. This finding is consistent with what we know from qualitative 
research, but it contradicts what other researchers have found. That is, we 
know that while deregulation began in the late 1970s and early 1980s, it 
initially only affected long distance markets, where only a small percentage 
of the work force is employed. Local telephone service only began to be 
affected by de regu la t ion in the late 1980s and early 1990s. O t h e r 
researchers have argued that the most important deregulatory changes in 
this and other service industries occurred from 1978 to 1982 and that the 
most dramatic changes in wage inequality occurred during the 1980s 
(Fortin and Lemieux 1997). 
Table 1 shows changes in wage inequality in telecommunications com-
pared to the economy as a whole. Among clerical workers, wage inequality 
rose by 25.6%, compared to only 7.5% for clericals in the U.S. as a whole. 
By 1996, the 90/10 ratio for clericals in telecommunications was 2.75, close 
to the 2.95 ratio for all clericals. For sales workers in telecommunications, 
wage inequality increased by 44%; by 1996, the 90/10 wage ratio for sales 
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workers in telecommunications was 5.58, higher than the 5.54 ratio for 
sales workers in the U.S. as a whole. A similar, though less pronounced 
trend occurred among technical workers. 
TABLE 1 
Real Wages and Wage Inequality, by Occupational Group, 1983-1996 
Telecommunications Industry and U.S. Compared 
Clerical Workers 
Median real wkly earnings (telecom)* 
Median real wkly earnings (US)* 
Ratio: Telecom/US median earnings 
Ratio: All telecom 90710th earnings 
Ratio: All US 90/10th earnings 
Sales Workers 
Median real wkly earnings (telecom)* 
Median real wkly earnings (US)* 
Ratio: Telecom/US median earnings 
Ratio: All telecom 90/10th earnings 
Ratio: All US 90/10th earnings 
Technical Workers 
Median real wkly earnings (telecom)* 
Median real wkly earnings (US)* 
Ratio: Telecom/US median earnings 
Ratio: All telecom 90/10th earnings 
Ratio: All US 90/10th earnings 
1983 
$361 
$255 
1.42 
2.19 
2.74 
$479 
$301 
1.59 
3.88 
4.67 
$498 
$373 
1.33 
2.11 
3.07 
1996 
$319 
$255 
1.25 
2.75 
2.95 
$382 
$294 
1.30 
5.58 
5.54 
$473 
$351 
1.35 
2.75 
3.37 
% 
Change 
1983-90 
-0.5 
5.0 
-5.3 
18.1 
1.7 
-16.1 
1.6 
-17.5 
-0.7 
13.7 
-1.7 
-1.7 
0.0 
9.8 
5.1 
% 
Change 
1990-96 
-11.3 
-5.0 
-6.6 
7.6 
5.8 
-4.0 
-4.1 
-0.7 
44.7 
4.9 
-3.4 
-4.5 
1.2 
20.6 
4.6 
% 
Change 
1983-96 
-11.8 
0.0 
-11.8 
25.6 
7.5 
-20.2 
-2.5 
-18.1 
44.0 
18.6 
-5.0 
-6.1 
1.2 
30.4 
9.7 
Source: CPS merged annual earnings files; * CPI-U adjusted. 
Deunionization has been significant, although the industry continues to 
be the most highly unionized in the U.S. Deunionization occurred primarily 
because the traditional unionized companies cut labor costs by reducing em-
ployment levels rather than wages. At the same time, employment grew 
among new, low-wage, nonunion firms (as well as new nonunion operations 
of the traditional Bell companies). Overall unionization in the industry fell 
from 55.5% in 1983 to 28.7% in 1996. Within the major occupational groups, 
union density fell from 63% to 35% among clerical and sales workers and 
from 68% to 52% among technical workers. That is, the female-dominated, 
semiskilled occupations have been more negatively affected by deunioniza-
tion than have male-dominated technical occupations. Again, the decline in 
union density after 1990 accounts for half to three-quarters of the change for 
the total period, depending upon the occupational group (Table 2). 
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TABLE 2 
Deunionization and Union/Nonunion Wage Inequality, by Occupational Group: 
Telecommunications Industry, 1983-1996 
Clerical &• Sales Workers 
Total employment 
Percent union 
Union median wkly earnings 
Nonunion median wkly earnings 
Union med. real wkly earnings* 
Nonunion med. real wkly earnings* 
Ratio: Union/nonunion median 
wkly earnings 
Technical Workers 
Total employment 
Percent union 
Union median wkly earnings 
Nonunion median wkly earnings 
Union real med. wkly earnings* 
Nonunion real med. wkly earnings* 
Ratio: Union/nonunion median 
wkly earnings 
1983 
450,755 
62.6 
$360 
$380 
$361 
$382 
0.95 
374,400 
67.5 
$486 
$500 
$488 
$502 
0.97 
1996 
388,655 
34.5 
$553 
$480 
$352 
$306 
1.15 
294,359 
51.7 
$772 
$694 
$492 
$442 
1.11 
% 
Change 
1983-90 
-5.0 
-14.1 
32.5 
23.7 
1.0 
-5.7 
7.1 
-8.9 
-4.4 
31.7 
28.0 
0.4 
-2.5 
2.9 
% 
Change 
1990-96 
-8.7 
-30.9 
21.1 
2.6 
-3.5 
-14.1 
14.5 
-12.4 
-18.9 
27.2 
10.8 
0.5 
-9.4 
11.6 
% 
Change 
1983-96 
-13.8 
-44.9 
53.6 
26.3 
-2.5 
-19.8 
21.6 
-21.4 
-23.3 
58.8 
38.8 
0.8 
-11.9 
14.4 
Source: CPS merged annual earnings files; * CPI-U adjusted. 
Deunionization has contributed to growing wage inequality primarily 
through the decline in real wages among nonunion workers. That is, while 
union workers suffered force reductions, the union succeeded in negotiat-
ing high relative wages that closely track the CPI index so that real wages 
for unionized workers did not fall or fell only slightly. By contrast, real 
wages for nonmanagement workers in the nonunion segment declined by 
15% to 20%, depending on the occupational group. As a result, the 
union/nonunion wage gap increased by over 15% during the period, with 
the bulk of the increase occurring after 1990 (Table 2). 
Another source of rising wage inequality is the increase in dispersion 
within both the union and the nonunion segments. Table 3 illustrates these 
trends. Among unionized sales and clerical workers, the 90/10 wage ratio 
increased from 2.00 in 1983 to 2.43 in 1996; for the nonunion group, it 
grew at a somewhat higher rate, from 3.30 to 4.25 over the same period. 
The story of the changing wage structure among union and nonunion 
technical workers is strikingly different than for clerical and sales workers. 
For nonunion workers, the 90/10 ratio remained unchanged (at 3.13) for 
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$223 
$446 
$221 
$729 
2.00 
3.30 
$351 
$602 
$241 
$753 
1.71 
3.13 
$188 
$456 
$153 
$650 
2.43 
4.25 
$306 
$690 
$224 
$701 
2.25 
3.13 
-3.9 
3.0 
-13.4 
-16.0 
7.1 
-3.0 
-12.9 
1.6 
1.6 
1.6 
16.7 
0.0 
-11.8 
-0.6 
-17.3 
5.2 
14.2 
31.8 
0.0 
12.9 
-8.5 
-8.5 
14.8 
0.0 
-15.6 
2.4 
-30.7 
-10.8 
21.4 
28.8 
-12.9 
14.5 
-6.9 
-6.9 
31.5 
0.0 
TABLE 3 
Growth of Wage Inequality within Union and Non-Union Segments, by Occupation: 
Telecommunications Industry, 1983-1996 
% % % 
Change Change Change 
1983 1996 1983-90 1990-96 1983-96 
Clerical b- Sales Workers 
Union 10%ile real wkly earnings* 
Union 90%ile real wkly earnings* 
Nonunion 10%ile real wkly earnings* 
Nonunion 90%ile real earnings* 
Ratio: Union 90/10th earnings 
Ratio: Nonunion 90/10th earnings 
Technical Workers 
Union 10%ile real wkly earnings* 
Union 90%ile real wkly earnings* 
Nonunion 10%ile real wkly earnings* 
Nonunion 90%ile real wkly earnings* 
Ratio: Union 90/10th earnings 
Ratio: Nonunion 90/10th earnings 
Source: CPS merged annual earnings files; * CPI-U adjusted. 
"This paper is based on a larger project, funded by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, which 
analyzes the relationship between deregulation, management and union strategies, and labor 
market outcomes. 
the period. In the union segment, the opposite occurred: the 90/10 ratio 
increased 31.5% for union workers (from 1.71 to 2.25). The increased wage 
dispersion is about equally attributable to a decline in the lower 10th per-
centile (during the 1980s) and an increase in wages in the upper 90th per-
centile (in the 1990s). 
The increase in wage dispersion in the union segment is most likely due 
to two sources: (a) management strategies designed to create new job titles 
and segment labor according to market segments (increases across wage 
grades); (b) union strategies to negotiate pay raises primarily at the high 
end of any wage grade—for workers with five years seniority who tradition-
ally comprise the bulk of the work force (within wage grade dispersion). In 
the 1990s, the companies misjudged the demand for new services, particu-
larly the internet, and downsized more than necessary. As a result, many 
more employees now receive entry level wages. 
Notably, however, for both occupational groups, nonunion workers at 
the high end (90th percentile) experienced falling real wages: 11% among 
clerical and sales workers and 7% among technical workers. This finding 
runs contrary to the idea that the market demand for high technical skills 
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(whether in office computers or programming skills) would raise wage dis-
persion. That is, among nonunion workers, the higher-skilled workers 
found their wages falling despite the common perception that technical 
skills are in short supply in the industry. 
Conclusions 
This review of trend data in the telecommunications industry shows 
that huge changes in union density and wage inequality have occurred in 
little over a decade, despite the fact that real deregulation in the industry is 
only beginning. The union/nonunion wage gap has grown by 15% to 20% 
because unions succeeded in negotiating wage increases that track the 
CPI, but nonunion wages fell significantly. Wage inequality within the 
union segment has also grown, but does not yet meet the levels of the 
nonunion segment. These findings are dramatic, but they understate the 
extent of change because the analysis does not include part-time employ-
ees or nonwage (benefits) compensation. Because nonunion employers are 
more likely to use lower-paid part-time workers and are more likely to pro-
vide lower benefits, the extent of total wage dispersion between the union 
and nonunion segments is probably underestimated. 
Another important finding is that the effects of deunionization and ris-
ing wage inequality are more pronounced for female than for male occupa-
tions. Other researchers, by contrast, have found that for the economy as a 
whole, while deunionization significantly affected the rise in male wage 
inequality in the U.S., the declining minimum wage had a more significant 
effect on female wage inequality The telecommunications industry, how-
ever, is unique in its high unionization rates among women. Women in 
telecommunications historically have earned over twice the average wage 
of women in other service industries (Spalter-Roth and Hartmann 1995). 
On the nonunion side, the dramatic fall in nonunion wages is striking 
because telecommunications is a high-skilled industry with a high demand 
for workers with digital technology skills. A commonly held belief in the 
industry is that the demand for technically skilled workers is high relative 
to the supply. Yet in the nonunion sector, real wages in both the clerical 
and sales and the technical occupations are falling, even among those in 
the 90th percentile—those we would presume to be the most in demand. 
Finally, the timing of all of these changes is noteworthy because the most 
dramatic changes occurred after 1990, despite the fact that deregulation 
began in 1984. Whereas nonunion wages tracked union levels through the 
late 1980s, both deunionization and the growth in the union/nonunion wage 
gap accelerated in the 1990s. In other words, it appears that initially following 
deregulation, the nonunion entrants copied the dominant union model; but 
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by 1990, the nonunion firms adopted their own low-wage strategies. Given 
lower overall costs, new entrants would be well positioned to engage in a 
high-wage, high-commitment strategy to complement investment in new 
technology. On average, they do not appear to be pursuing this approach. 
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